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Abstract:Localizing the brain correlates related to moral judgments, using neuroimage techniques (and
also studies on brain lesions), seems to be, without doubt, one of the big events in the history of the
normative social sciences.The best neuroscientific model of normative judgment available today
establishes that the ethical-cerebral law operator counts on, in his neural evaluative-affective systems,
a permanent presence of requirements, obligations and strategies, with a “should be” that incorporates
internally rational and emotional reasons, that are constitutively integrated in all the activities at the
practical, theoretical and normal levels of every process of exercising the law.

Localizing the brain correlates related to moral judgments, using neuroimage
techniques (and also studies on brain lesions), seems to be, without doubt, one of
the big events in the history of the normative social sciences. Indeed as
neuroscience allows an ever more sophisticated understanding of the brain, the
possible moral, juridical and social implications of these advances in the knowledge
of our sophisticated ontogenetic cognitive program begin to be seriously considered
under a much more empirical light and with respect for scientific methods. The
object would be, in principle, the intention to clarify the location of high cognitive
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functions understood as Homo sapiens apomorphisms of the capacity to elaborate
moral judgments.
But there is no doubt that, from the evidence obtained, we can go much
further.

These advances, however, in addition to their extraordinary scientific

relevance, also carry important philosophical, juridical and moral connotations,
particularly regarding the understanding of the superior cognitive processes related
to ethical juridical judgments, which are understood as functional states of brain
processes. It starts from the conviction that, to understand this essential part of the
ethical juridical universe, it is necessary to go inside the brain, to the brain substrates
responsible for our moral judgment and whose genesis and functioning should then
be reintegrated in the evolutionary history of our species.
And although cognitive neuroscience research into moral judgments and
normative judgment in law and in justice is still at a very early stage, its use seems to
be undoubted. With one condition: that in an area as delicate as that of
neuroscientific investigation, results should be considered with great caution.
Because science, that certainly will serve to ensure more knowledge about human
nature, will not be able to guarantee, by itself, moral values as they can be a greater
respect to human life, equality and liberty.
This is perhaps the reason why questions and philosophic and moral doubts
abound in the crossover area between neuroscience and law: we are in the case of
moral judgment or other similar perceptive phenomena, before much more unitary
and discreet cognitive processes, or are they only phenomena that emerged from
many psychological mechanisms articulated in time and space? Are these dead
processes or a series of processes that have some aspect of universal character, in
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the sense that they have some common nuclear component capable of determining
in each individual his particular valorization of what is or is not just?

Will it be

possible some day to describe this process or processes (or their key components)
in more objective terms? Should their origin be sought in some idiosyncratic pattern
of neuroactivity that contains at least some identifiable time sequences shared by all
the individuals?

Unlike what seems to occur in the neural base of the artistic

faculties (Changeux, 1994; Vigouroux, 1992) , there are some neural areas whose
specific intervention is in a certain way critical and universal in the mark of the widely
distributed activity that a very probably subjugates – as in all the and superior
cognitive program services (Vigouroux, 1992) – to the phenomenon of the moral
experience?

How much

do the heredity and learning history of each individual

contribute to starting or activating of this supposed functional pattern?

Can the

modern neuroimage techniques be useful not only to locate the brain seat of such an
activity trait, if only, but also, to identify the differential implication of certain
distributed circuits?
Especially regarding the juridical phenomenon the problem of localizing the
brain correlates that dictate the sense of justice raises the following questions: what
is the relationship between the results of neuroscientific investigation on moral and
juridical cognition and the theoretical perspectives of the law? At what point can it
be linked confidently and so decisively so that cognitive neuroscience questions the
results of juridical comprehension and exercise? How can a neuroscientific model of
normative judgment in law and in Justice offer powerful reasons that could come to
account for the subjacent falsity to the common conceptions of human psychology
(and rationality)? How much does this neuroscientific perspective have to do with
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the current theoretical and methodological edifice of juridical science? Or, as we are,
how will it change our conception about Man regarding the cause and purpose of law
and, consequently regarding the task of the jurist-interpreter to give “hermeneutic life”
to positive law?
Well, one of the most common fetishes of current juridical science, inherited
from the traditional concept of the juridical method that aims to rescue the values of
juridical order, truth and security, is to ensure that the judges should limit themselves
to applying to individual cases the general norms to cases dictated by the legislator,
following a formal process of

logical and subjective deduction.

It is a merely

descriptive operation, cognoscitive of a previously established and “reproductive”
norm of the legislator´s will (who has the exclusive responsibilities of the axiological
and normative intentions established in the laws). Such an operation, starting from
the supposition of emotional neutrality, of the rationality and objectivity of the
interpreter, reduces the judge to a mere technician in applying the mechanisms of
the law, as the responsible for the search (or simple knowledge) of his will, as the
description, that can be true or false, of its prior and pre-existing authentic
significance to the interpretive activity itself.
Indeed, all the hermeneutic construction and the unit itself of the realization of
the law elaborated by the contemporary theories assume, nowadays, the dominant
way of explanation of the theory of rational choice, constructing a rational image from
what seems to be, in itself, irrational. Its fundamental concept is that, above all else,
the judges are essentially rational and objective in their value judgments about the
justice of the decision: they examine as well as they can the facts pertinent to the
case and ponder, always neutrally and without emotion, the probable results that
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would follow from each of the potential choices. The preferred (“just”) option is that
the best fits the criteria of rationality and objectivity by which it was generated.
The indicated analysis process contains, in essence, an operation
incompatible with the knowledge accrued by neuroscience. That is constructing a
model of extreme rationality (of the judge’s decision) from something that is
configured essentially as an activity with accentuated irrational components.
But this does not seem to be an adequate image of how the brain functions
when we formulate moral judgments about the just or unjust, such as the acceptance
of the undoubted presence of illogical elements and, in general, from the values in
juridical reasoning meaning that, nowadays, they already do not consider acceptable
or legitimate the fact of continuing considering the hermeneutic task as an operation
or set of operations ruled exclusively by deductive or cognitive syllogism. Indeed, the
human mind

seems to be full of traits and defects in design that cover up our

biological inheritance regarding full objectivity and cognitive rationality.
The most influential theorists of positive law from the last century (especially
Kelsen, but also Hart, with the necessary backgrounds) do not offer us a theory of
application of the law, but rather limit themselves to considering that where there is
no mechanical application or subjection we should speak discretion in a strong
sense, in other words, of the creative activity of the law, understanding this to be an
act of discretionary will in which reason appears in a merely instrumental condition.
For Kelsen, for example, every act of interpretation is of voluntary, and not cognitive,
nature. From this one understands that the active “application” of the law consists in
reality of an authentic decision, a constructive act and not merely a declarative act,
similarly to what happens with the acts of the legislator.
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Furthermore, not only are the majority of judicial decisions taken with relative
speed, in complex scenarios and with partial and incomplete information and even
under conditions of uncertainty - as the judges - in the process of exercising the law,
do not stop being human beings imbued with every ethical concern, with certain
values, preferences and moral intuitions, so that it does not seem legitimate or
reasonable to interpose, in the application of the law, an impassable barrier between
the desired objectivity and the emotional subjectivity of the interpreter. The process
of exercise the law on the part of the judge implies, in the last analysis, a task that
can be considered constructive and emotional, personal and creative in a certain
sense, although not absolutely free or without links to the judge.
Indeed, a single solution cannot be spoken of, a single correct response,
meaning precisely that who applies the law can choose among various possible
solutions, all of them correct, in other words, all of them derivable from the norms
that integrate the juridical system and following the procedure established in it. And
if it is thus, if several correct solutions or responses are possible for the same
juridical problem, the final choice, necessarily unique, is then presented as not
derived exclusively from the system, circumstance that immediately raises at least
three basic questions: of epistemological order, of axiological-political order and of
subjective-individual order of the jurist interpreter.
And it is this finding that makes not only the notion of habitual rationality in
juridical science the objective of drastic revisions, but the same idea that juridical
science is founded on objectivity, neutrality and rationality of the operator of the law
has been assaulted recently from all directions.

Soon, starting from some

tendencies in philosophy and in philosophy of law, but also, and maybe more
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incisively and strongly, on the part of the cognitive scientists, of the philosophers of
the mind and the advances from cognitive neuroscience. And with the result that,
although when some notion of rationality in the process of exercising the law seem
undoubtful (to accept the idea that intentionality is not required a task previously
condemned to failure), the process of value derivation is not of a basically neutral,
objective or rational nature.
If it is certain that moral choice cannot exist without reason (individual
preferences and instrumental reason), it is no less certain that “intuition” is

the

characteristic human range of emotions that produces the proposals, goals,
objectives, wants, needs, desires, fears, empathy, aversions and the ability to feel
other people´s pain and suffering. We formulate moral judgments on the just and
unjust not only because we are capable of reason (as expressed in the game theory
and the juridical interpretation theory) but, rather, because we are equipped with
certain innate moral intuitions and emotional stimuli that characterize human
sensitivity and allow us to connect potentially with all other human beings.
Definitely, due to the fact that the evolutionary pressure did not increase (in an
“optimal” way) human rationality, any construction of a juridical theory of exercising
the law should imply a re-dimensioning of the psycho-biological understanding of the
access to reason itself. In particular, it should start by rejecting of any conception
about rationality objectivity and neutrality caused by ignorance of the functioning of
our brain, especially those related to the brain correlates that intervene in the
cognitive process of forming moral judgments to decide between the just or the
unjust.

7

8
In other words, if the last factor of individualization of the response or
conclusion of the juridical reasoning does not proceed from the juridical system
(although it should be compatible with it), it seems obvious that the personal
convictions of the operator of the law must take precedence.

And because for

hermeneutics the subject-object model is not viable in the human science ambience,
the subjectivity present in every act of understanding, interpretation and juridical
application should be approached by analysis of the brain processes of the law
operator. Paraphrasing the warning by Philip Tobias (1997) regarding language,
judgement is a brain activity.
Thus the ethical juridical judgment based not only on reasoning but also on
emotions and moral sentiments produced by the brain cannot be considered as
totally independent from the constitution and functioning of this organ that, in a first
analyses, seems not to have a single and differentiated head centers for moral
cognition.

The best neuroscientific model of normative judgment available today

establishes that the ethical-cerebral law operator counts on, in his neural evaluativeaffective systems, a permanent presence of requirements, obligations and strategies,
with a “should be” that incorporates internally rational and emotional reasons, that
are constitutively integrated in all the activities at the practical, theoretical and normal
levels of every process of exercising the law.
Indeed, the neuroscientific model of normative judgment in the law and justice
seems to suggest that juridical reasoning implies a wide recruiting and use of
different systems of mental skills (related both to rational and emotional thought) and
various information sources (Goodenough & Prehn, 2005). It is the coordinated and
integrated activity of various brain structures that makes human moral conduct
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possible, that is, that moral judgment integrates the frontal regions of the brain with
other centers, in a processes that implies emotion and intuition as fundamental
components. And further, that each one of these brain functions intervenes in a wide
diversity of cognitive operations, some related with social intelligence and others not
(Green et alii 2001 and 2002; Moll et alii, 2002 and 2003).
It seems beyond doubt the fact that the investigations in cognitive
neuroscience of the moral, and a very especially of the normative judgment in Law
and Justice, may provide an enormous and rich contribution to the detailed
understanding of the internal functioning of the human brain in the act of judging – of
forming moral judgments about the just and the unjust.

Neuroscience may

subminister the necessary evidence about the nature of the brain zones activated
and the brain stimuli implied in the decision process, on the degree of personal
involvement of the judges and the cultural conditioning in each concrete case, and
also on the limits of rationality and the degree of influence of the emotions and the
human sentiments in the formulation and conception about the “best decision”.
Without forgetting of course, other distinctive aspects of the nature of human
behavior at the time of deciding on the sense of concrete justice and the existence of
a moral universe determined by the biological nature of our cognitive (neuronal)
architecture. After all it is the brain that allows us to have a moral sense, that gives
us the necessary skills to live in society and solve certain social conflicts and that
serves as a base for the most sophisticated philosophical discussions and reflections
on rights, duties, injustice and morality.
So the neuroscientific investigation of moral and juridical cognition has, in a
certain way, revolutionized our understanding about the nature of thought and
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human behavior, with profound consequences that may affect the domain itself of
the juridical phenomenon. And as there seems to be no human institution more
fundamental than the juridical norm and, in the field of scientific process, nothing
more fascinating than the study of the brain, the union as these two elements
(norm/brain) ends up representing a naturally fascinating and stimulating
combination, since the juridical norm (its interpretation and application) and the
behavior that seeks to regulate it are both products of mental processes.
It is also precipitate to think that the first neuroscientific investigations about
moral and normative judgment already open the door to a better humanity. I fear
that this would be to simplify things to extremes. Thus as ingenious creationism can
condemn human beings to a permanent minority age, thus also an incomplete
neuroscientific model can lead us to conceive incorrect illusions. Because it is not
abssolutely certain that more and better knowledge of the neuronal conditioners of
humans will automatically give us a more dignified human life. If only things were so
simple!
To think that the brain/moral/law relationship is everthing can lead us to forget
that the measure of the law, the idea in essence of the law, is human whose nature
results not only from a very complicated mix of genes and neurons but also from
experiences, values, learning and influences from our equally complicated social and
cultural life.
The mystery of man consists precisely in warning that each person is a secret
to himself. Neuroscience will help us to understand a series of elements that form
the mystery, but they will not completely eliminate it.
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Thus, assuming the mystery will always remain, science may lead us to
understand better that the search for an adequate methodological criterion to
understand and realize the law can be considered, above all, as the archeology of
these structures and brain correlates related to the processing of ethical juridical
information.
It could even help us to understand that the hermeutic activity is formulated
precisely from an anthropological position and triggers the phenomenal energy of
human action; that only from the point of view of the human being and from his
nature can the judge represent the sense and the function of the law as a unit in a
vital, ethical and cultural context. This context establishes that human beings live the
representations and meanings designed for corporation, dialogue and argumentation
and processed in their brain structures. That in their “exist with” and situated on a
certain historical existential horizon, members of humanity continuously complain
about others, whose changeability is accepted, that justifies their choices bringing
the reasons that subject and motivate them.
But although we still do not know much about the functioning of our brain,
converting this sea of speculations into certainly a task waiting for science, in the
exact sense that a deeper understanding of the ultimate causes (rooted in our
nature) of human moral and juridical behavior may be very useful to ascertain which
are the limits and the conditions of possibility of ethics and the law in the context of
contemporary societies.
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